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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">voprstat</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Вопросы статистики</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Voprosy Statistiki</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2313-6383</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2658-5499</issn><publisher><publisher-name></publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">voprstat-560</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ В ФИНАНСОВЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯХ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>STATISTICAL METHODS IN FINANCIAL STUDIES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>ВЛИЯНИЕ СИСТЕМЫ СТРАХОВАНИЯ ВКЛАДОВ НА РИСКИ БАНКОВ</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>IMPACT OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM ON THE RISKS OF BANKS</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Поляков</surname><given-names>Константин Львович</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Polyakov</surname><given-names>Konstantin L.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>канд. техн. наук, доцент, департамент прикладной экономики факультета экономических наук </p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">polyakov.kl@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Полякова</surname><given-names>Марина Васильевна</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Polyakova</surname><given-names>Marina V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>канд. техн. наук, доцент, департамент финансов факультета экономических наук</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">mpolyakova@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Хабибуллина</surname><given-names>А. Р.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Khabibullina</surname><given-names>Aida R.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>независимый эксперт</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>independent expert</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">khabibullina.aida@gmail.com</email></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University Higher School of Economics</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>09</day><month>10</month><year>2017</year></pub-date><volume>1</volume><issue>9</issue><fpage>27</fpage><lpage>41</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Поляков К.Л., Полякова М.В., Хабибуллина А.Р., 2017</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2017</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Поляков К.Л., Полякова М.В., Хабибуллина А.Р.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Polyakov K.L., Polyakova M.V., Khabibullina A.R.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://voprstat.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/560">https://voprstat.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/560</self-uri><abstract><p>Настоящее исследование посвящено анализу влияния системы страхования вкладов (ССВ) на функционирование банковских систем. Приведенный в работе обзор отражает разнообразие мнений аналитиков относительно характера данного влияния. Обобщение исследований позволяет сделать вывод о том, что в периоды нестабильности ССВ способствует укреплению банковской системы, предотвращая, в частности, «набеги» вкладчиков на банки. В то же время в периоды роста экономики страхование вкладов может привести к росту морального риска. В центре внимания данного исследования банковские системы стран БРИКС: Россия входит в нее, и по мнению ряда аналитиков, страны БРИКС имеют неплохие перспективы развития. При этом нельзя не отметить, что объединение это, на взгляд авторов, достаточно искусственное и, как показывает реальная практика, пути развития стран-участниц и достигнутые результаты сильно различаются. Тем не менее общим является наличие интенсивных переходных процессов, ведущих к существенной нестабильности в экономике и наличию серьезных социальных проблем, в частности бедности, сильного расслоения общества и коррупции. В первой части работы проведен сравнительный анализ систем страхования вкладов в странах БРИКС. Его результаты показывают, что подходы к организации страхования вкладов у членов ассоциации весьма различны. Так, в Южно-Африканской Республике система страхования вкладов функционирует в неявном виде (то есть законодательно не закреплена). В некоторых странах она находится в частной собственности (или не имеет государственных гарантий). Во второй части работы дается математико-статистический анализ влияния системы страхования вкладов на уровень рисков, которые принимают на себя банки в странах БРИКС. Наличие и качество данных о состоянии банковских систем и деятельности систем страхования вкладов в открытом доступе позволили провести полноценный анализ только для двух стран - России и Бразилии. Для прочих участников ассоциации был проведен сокращенный анализ. Результаты оценивания моделей для панельных данных позволили заключить, что влияние увеличения суммы страхового покрытия на уровень рисков существенно зависит от характеристик кризисной ситуации (при наличии таковой), уровня контроля банковской среды регулятором и доли депозитов в валюте баланса, которые попадают под юрисдикцию ССВ.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Current study focuses on the analysis of the impact of the deposit insurance system on the functioning of national banking system. Literature review reflects the difference in the opinions of analytics about the character of this impact. Summarizing points of view one may conclude that in unstable periods deposit insurance system may strengthen the banking system and prevent customers run. At the same time, during periods of economic growth deposit insurance may lead to the additional moral hazard. This research focuses on the banking systems of the BRICS countries: Russia is part of it, and, according to some analysts, the BRICS countries have good prospects for development. However, this association, in the authors’ opinion, is rather artificial which is supported by the fact that development trajectories of its members as well as the achieved  results are very different. Nevertheless, there is a common element - intensive transitions leading to significant instability in the economy and the presence of serious social problems, in particular poverty, a strong stratification of society and corruption. First part of the article presents comparative analysis of deposit insurance systems in the BRICS countries. Its results demonstrate that the approaches to organization of deposit insurance among members of the association are somewhat different. For example, in South Africa, the deposit insurance system functions in an implicit manner (i.e., not legislated). In some countries it is privately owned (or has no state guarantees). The second part introduces mathematical and statistical analysis of the impact that deposit insurance system has on the level of risks that banks of BRICS take. Online availability and quality of data on the state of the banking systems and activities of deposit insurance systems allowed for a full-fledged analysis only for the Russian Federation and Brazil. As for the rest of member-countries, the authors performed brief analysis. The results of estimating models for panel data made it possible to conclude that the effect of increasing the amount of insurance cover on the level of risks depends significantly on the characteristics of the crisis situation (if any), the level of control of the banking environment by the regulator and the proportion of deposits in the balance currency that fall under the jurisdiction of the deposit insurance system.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>риски банковской системы</kwd><kwd>система страхования вкладов (ССВ)</kwd><kwd>эконометрический анализ</kwd><kwd>панельная регрессия</kwd><kwd>обратная причинность</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>banking system risks</kwd><kwd>deposit insurance system (DIS)</kwd><kwd>econometric analysis</kwd><kwd>panel regression</kwd><kwd>reverse causality</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Diamond D.W., Dybvig P.H. 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